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The  study  analyses  the individual  and  joint  impact  of  family  control  and  diversiﬁcation  on the  perfor-
mance  of major  Spanish  corporations,  considering  the  nature  of  the  ultimate  owner  of  non-family  groups.
The study  uses  a sample  of  ninety-nine  Spanish  corporations,  each  comprising  a parent  company  listed  on
the stock  exchange  and  a  set of  subsidiaries.  Heckman’s  two-step  correction  is used  to  eliminate  selection
bias and the  endogeneity  of  family  ownership.  Different  models  are  contemplated  in  which  we analyse
the  impact  of both  diversiﬁcation  and  the  family  nature  of  a business  on performance,  established  as
Tobin’s  q-value.  The  results  show  how  family  control  has  a negative  impact  on Tobin’s  q-value,  and  that21
eyword:
amily ﬁrm
usiness group
iversiﬁcation
erformance
differences  are  greater  between  family  groups  and  non-family  groups  controlled  by banks  and/or  foreign
agents. They  also  show  how  diversiﬁcation  does  not  affect  the creation  of value  either  individually  or
considering  the  possible  moderating  effect  of  family  ownership.
© 2016  AEDEM.  Published  by  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).ltimate owner
. Introduction
In world economies, families are among the most important
hareholders in business organisations (Aguilera & Crespi-Cladera,
016; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). There are mul-
iple deﬁnitions of a family business (Mazzi, 2011), although there
ppears to be consensus in that a ﬁrm is a family business when
amily members own a majority of shares, are involved in manage-
ent, form part of the board of directors and wish to transmit the
rm to subsequent generations (Mazzi, 2011).
The family nature of a business group determines strategies
Aguilera & Crespi-Cladera, 2016; Dawson & Mussolino, 2014),
ncluding diversiﬁcation (Banalieva & Eddleston, 2011; Praet, 2013)
nd its subsequent impact on performance (Kang, 1999; Mun˜oz
 Sánchez, 2011). Family members not only pursue ﬁnancial tar-
ets, but also aim to maintain socio-emotional wealth (Cennamo,
errone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012; Deephouse & Jaskiewicz,
013; Gómez-Mejía, Makri, & Larraza, 2010). Family groups will
hus prefer diversiﬁcation strategies that are compatible with
aintaining socio-emotional wealth that do not endanger survival,
ith an impact on performance.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: alex@unizar.es (A. Hernández-Trasobares).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iedeen.2016.04.001
444-8834/© 2016 AEDEM. Published by Elsevier Espan˜a, S.L.U. This is an open access ar
d/4.0/).Initially, the lack of socio-emotional wealth in non-family enter-
prises means that they aim to maximise performance. However, do
all non-family groups act the same? In non-family groups where
there is no shareholder of reference (who can exercise effective
control), management has more discretionary power and tends to
aim to satisfy its own needs instead of creating value for sharehol-
ders, with a negative impact on performance (Jensen, 1986). In this
respect, managers can use diversiﬁcation to improve their income
and prestige, even if it has a negative impact on business perfor-
mance (Jensen, 1986). The presence of a shareholder of reference in
other non-family groups (banks, foreign ﬁrms) facilitates the goal
of maximising performance, and thus the use of more appropriate
diversiﬁcation strategies.
Given the above characteristics of family holdings and the dif-
ferences with non-family groups (primarily with groups “with no
effective control”, where there is no shareholder of reference), there
are two  questions that this study attempts to answer. How does
family control and degree of diversiﬁcation affect performance,
both individually and together? What are the differences in rela-
tion to different non-family businesses, speciﬁcally where there is
no shareholder of reference?A family can decide not to participate in new proﬁtable busi-
nesses due to the need for new ﬁnancial, human and material
resources, and the possible loss of control derived from new share-
holders, which would have a negative effect on socio-emotional
ticle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
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ealth (Cennamo et al., 2012). In these cases, non-family groups
ave the advantage of not having to consider socio-emotional
ealth in their utility function. The desire for a family ﬁrm’s survival
nd transmission, however, generates a greater concern related
o new medium and long-term proﬁtable investments, as family
embers would carefully choose diversiﬁcation projects that have
 real positive impact on performance, thus revealing an advan-
age relative to non-family enterprises, where there is no desire
o transmit ownership to subsequent generations. All these dif-
erences between family and non-family corporations would also
e greater in relation to groups “with no effective control” due to
he lack of a shareholder of reference and the difference between
anagers’ and shareholders’ interests.
Both family control and diversiﬁcation are determinants of
usiness performance, albeit with mixed conclusions in the liter-
ture (Benito, Guerras, & Zun˜iga, 2012; Miller, Le Breton Miller, &
cholnick, 2008). There are few studies, however, that analyse the
oint effect of family control and diversiﬁcation on business per-
ormance, other than Kang (1999) and Mun˜oz and Sánchez (2011).
he lack of homogeneity in the conclusions of previous research and
he lack of studies considering the nature of the ultimate owner of
on-family groups justify the need to delve deeper into the indi-
idual and joint impact of family control and diversiﬁcation on
erformance.
This study also aims to advance in the analysis of the impact of
iversiﬁcation and family control on performance. The study has
everal objectives. The ﬁrst is to analyse the individual impact on
egree of diversiﬁcation and family control on performance. The
econd is to establish differences in performance between family
nd non-family holdings, with the latter including the nature of the
ltimate owner. In this case, the differences will be established rel-
tive to groups with no shareholder of reference (“without effective
ontrol”), rather than to family groups, although also considering
roups controlled by banks and foreign agents. The third and ﬁnal
bjective consists of determining the joint impact of family con-
rol and diversiﬁcation on performance, thus determining whether
amily ownership, in which the preservation of socio-emotional
ealth is key, can affect the use of more or less successful diversiﬁ-
ation strategies compared with non-family groups in general, and
roups “without effective control” in particular.
We  thus analyse a sample of 99 corporations, the parent com-
anies of which were listed on the Spanish stock exchange during
he 2000–2005 period. The Heckman two-step correction (1979)
s used to test the established hypotheses, as it corrects the selec-
ion bias derived from diversiﬁcation and the possible existence
f endogeneity derived from family ownership (Demsetz & Lehn,
985).
The study makes several contributions to the ﬁeld of research.
irstly, the analytical unit is a business group, comprising a listed
arent company and a set of subsidiaries. The activities of both the
isted parent company and its subsidiaries provide a clearer idea of
orporate strategy, and the market’s evaluation of the parent com-
any shows investor expectations not only regarding the company
tself but also in relation to the entire group.
Secondly, when analysing the impact of the nature of the ulti-
ate owner on performance, we compare businesses controlled by
amily members with non-family groups, with reference to groups
ith greater managerial discretionality and/or which do not have
 shareholder of reference. The aim is to discover whether family
wnership has a more positive impact on performance than other
orporations with greater managerial discretionality (with a neg-
tive impact on performance). Following this analysis, we check
or the existence of similarity of performance of family groups and
roups controlled by banks and/or foreign agents, as managerial
iscretionality is more reduced in these cases, with a shareholder
f reference.n Management and Business Economics 23 (2017) 46–54 47
Finally, we aim to provide new evidence for Spain considering
the moderating effect of family ownership on the diversiﬁca-
tion/creation of value ratio.
This paper is structured as follows: we  ﬁrst establish the theo-
retical framework in which our hypotheses regarding the impact of
diversiﬁcation and family control on performance are formulated.
We then describe the database, the variables and the methodol-
ogy used to test said hypotheses. Thirdly, we  present and analyse
the results of the econometric models. Finally, we summarise
the study’s main conclusions, its limitations and future lines of
research.
2. Theoretical framework
The decision to diversify forms a fundamental part of the strate-
gic behaviour of corporations (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1994),
and plays a key role in enhancing their performance (Hull & Lee,
1999). Diversiﬁcation involves participating in new business or
markets by launching new products (Ansoff, 1976). By performing
new activities, ﬁrms can make us of surplus resources and capabili-
ties (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991), generating synergies between
activities and making the most of the opportunities to invest in
businesses that favour the creation of value (Martin & Sayrak, 2003).
Diversiﬁcation, however, increases coordination costs and informa-
tion asymmetries (Denis, Denis, & Yost, 2002), with which the ﬁrm’s
inﬂexibility costs grow (Porter, 1985) and its ability to react to mar-
ket changes diminishes. The literature often refers to diversiﬁcation
discount, which anticipates a negative impact of diversiﬁcation on
performance (Villalonga, 2004).
From an agency theory perspective, diversiﬁcation is the result
of greater managerial discretionality; by increasing the size of the
company, managers seek higher salaries, a reduction in personal
risk, secure job positions and greater power (Amihud & Lev, 1981;
Jensen & Murphy, 1990). New investments are not to maximise
value for shareholders, but to satisfy managers’ particular inter-
ests; they have a negative impact on performance and increase
agency costs (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Furthermore, the greater the
degree of diversiﬁcation, the easier it is for managers to access cap-
ital by the use of cross subsidies (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng,
2009), producing inefﬁcient resource allocation that reduces the
ﬁrm’s value (Berger & Ofek, 1995).
The negative impact of diversiﬁcation on performance, how-
ever, is not only due to the conﬂict between shareholders and
managers, but can also derive from conﬂicts between majority and
minority shareholders. If concentration of ownership is high, part
of the wealth of minority shareholders can be expropriated by
majority shareholders (Lins & Servaes, 2002). Said expropriation
is easier through diversiﬁcation, with tunnelling practices reduc-
ing the company’s value (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, &
Shleifer, 2000). Majority shareholders prefer new activities that do
not aim to maximise performance, but to favour their own  interests
(Johnson et al., 2000). Diversiﬁcation enables tunnelling practices,
where assets or results are transferred out of the ﬁrm in favour of
the majority shareholders, or cash ﬂow is transferred from one ﬁrm
to another (Johnson et al., 2000; Lins & Servaes, 2002), all of which
has a negative impact on the corporation’s performance.
Therefore, the ﬁrst hypothesis is:
H1. Business group’s diversiﬁcation has a negative impact on per-
formance.
The impact of family control on performance is a major line of
research in the literature, and there is no consensus regarding the
relationship between the two variables (Anderson & Reeb, 2003;
Miller et al., 2008; Sacristán, Gómez, & Cabeza, 2011). The impact
of family ownership on performance depends on the relationship
between pros and cons; if the advantages exceed the disadvantages
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here will be a positive relationship between family ownership and
erformance (Dyer, 2006).
Family ownership and control can have a positive effect on
erformance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Sraer & Thesmar, 2007).
amily business has high ownership concentration values, with
amily members involved in the ﬁrm’s management, with incen-
ives to supervise managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983), minimising
he principal-agent problem and agency costs (Demsetz & Lehn,
985). The presence of family executives leads to better perfor-
ance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Kowalewski, Talavera, & Stetsyuk,
010). Family control, however, can also have a negative effect
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005), as a high
oncentration of ownership in family ﬁrms can generate an agency
roblem between family members and other investors (minority
hareholders) (Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012; Zahra,
007). The family can present an opportunistic conduct satisfy-
ng its private needs (Jara, López, & López, 2008; Shleifer & Vishny,
997), taking part of the wealth belonging to minority shareholders
Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Villalonga & Amit, 2006) and thus having
 negative effect on the creation of value (Bloom & Van Reenen,
007).
Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nun˜ez, Jacobson, and Moyano (2007),
ropose a model in which family enterprises are adverse to
ocio-emotional wealth loss. According to Cennamo et al. (2012),
ocio-emotional wealth includes elements such as the desire to
aintain family control, the family’s identiﬁcation with the com-
any, the presence of emotional links and the desire to ensure the
rm’s survival. The family’s utility function thus maximises both
ocio-emotional wealth and ﬁnancial performance (Gómez-Mejía
t al., 2010). The desire to maintain control of the ﬁrm and to pre-
erve family links leads to priority being given to socio-emotional
ealth versus ﬁnancial performance (providing that the ﬁrm’s sur-
ival is not at risk), and families are willing to sacriﬁce greater
roﬁts for the same of socio-emotional wealth. A negative rela-
ionship is therefore expected between control and performance.
ccording to the socio-emotional wealth model, we establish the
econd hypothesis:
2. Family control has a negative impact on business group’s
erformance.
Non-family corporations can be controlled by foreign agents,
anks or the State, etc. From the agency theory perspective, how-
ver, the principal-agent problem is greater in groups where
wnership is more disperse and no single shareholder has effec-
ive control of the ﬁrm; managers aim to satisfy their own  needs,
hich are not the same as those of the other shareholders (Jensen &
eckling, 1976). In these groups (with no effective control), agency
osts will be higher and have a more negative effect on performance
Amihud & Lev, 1981).
When comparing corporations considering the nature of the
ltimate owner, the greatest differences are expected to be found
etween groups “with no effective control” and family enterprises,
here family control leads to a reduction in agency costs. Family
roups thus perform better than ﬁrms with disperse ownership or
o shareholder of reference (Wang, 2006). This leads to our third
ypothesis:
3. Family business groups perform better than groups where
here is no controlling shareholder (groups “with no effective con-
rol”).
After analysing the individual impact of diversiﬁcation and fam-
ly control on performance, the following question arises. Could the
mpact of diversiﬁcation on performance be conditioned by fam-
ly control? In other words, does family control ensure a more
r less successful diversiﬁcation process, having a positive orn Management and Business Economics 23 (2017) 46–54
negative moderating effect on performance compared to non-
family groups?
There are very few studies in the literature that answer these
questions. A ﬁrst approximation was provided by Kang (1999). For
a set of listed textile companies, it was found that family owner-
ship favours a positive impact of diversiﬁcation on performance.
According to Kang (1999), although family enterprises are more
reluctant to diversify, when they do decide to do so, they invest
in activities that have a more positive effect on performance, with
a view to ensuring the ﬁrm’s survival and transmission to subse-
quent generations. Family ﬁrms thus do not diversify for reasons
derived from managerial discretionary power, more common in
non-family ﬁrms that aim to maximise managers’ utility function
(Jensen, 1986), with a negative impact on performance.
The study conducted by Mun˜oz and Sánchez (2011) from a group
of European ﬁrms from 27 countries showed that family ﬁrms
are more proﬁtable than non-family enterprises when diversifying
both by product and internationally, although there are no differ-
ences if diversiﬁcation only affects product. According to Mun˜oz
and Sánchez (2011), family ﬁrms are more reluctant to accept the
change involved in diversiﬁcation, given that their goal is to pre-
serve family values and maintain control of the company. They do
not diversify, therefore until they have the experience and know-
how required to ensure the best possible performance. The family
will diversify when it has the required know-how, making use
of existing synergies and reducing dependence on a single ﬁrm’s
income and/or a single country, increasing the likelihood of survival
and the preservation of its assets (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010).
From a theoretical perspective, family ﬁrms seek survival
(Casson, 1999), preferring diversiﬁcation strategies that create
value without harming socio-emotional wealth. So although fam-
ily ﬁrms are more reluctant to diversify than others (Goranova,
Alessandri, Brandes, & Dharwadkar, 2007; May, 1995), when they
do decide to participate in new businesses they have to satisfy their
particular objectives without reducing socio-emotional wealth.
When comparing family and other enterprises, then, diversiﬁcation
is expected to have a positive impact on the former’s performance.
However, a “principal-principal” agency problem may arise
(Zahra, 2007), in which case diversiﬁcation strategies facilitate the
expropriation of the wealth of minority shareholders in favour
of the family, with a negative impact on performance. Diversi-
ﬁcation enables the use of tunnelling practices (Johnson et al.,
2000), with which the family can expropriate part of the wealth
of minority shareholders by transferring assets elsewhere, or by
transferring cash ﬂow between ﬁrms in favour of family interests
(Lins & Servaes, 2002). Diversiﬁcation also enables family mem-
bers to work in the corporation’s different companies (nepotism),
with a negative effect on performance (Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001).
Given these arguments, it is difﬁcult to quantify whether tunnelling
practices have a more negative impact on the effect of diversiﬁ-
cation on performance, compared to diversiﬁcation processes in
non-family groups, where they depend on more or less managerial
discretionality. Two hypotheses are therefore considered:
H4a. Family control has a positive moderating effect on the rela-
tionship between degree of diversiﬁcation and performance.
H4b. Family control does not have a moderating effect on the
relationship between degree of diversiﬁcation and performance.
The greatest differences related to family control are found
between family groups and enterprises “with no effective control”.
In the latter, diversiﬁcation is the result of the pursuit of satisfaction
of managers’ private interests, choosing strategies that can have a
negative impact on given the greater agency costs (Denis, Denis, &
Sarin, 1997). Yet although family ﬁrms are more reluctant to diver-
sify, and the preservation of socio-emotional wealth can lead to less
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erformance than non-family groups, when a family form decides
o perform new activities, which are not derived from a principal-
rincipal agency problem, the goal of creating value would have a
ositive impact on the interaction between family ownership and
iversiﬁcation (Kang, 1999). Our ﬁnal hypothesis, therefore, is:
5. Family control has a positive moderating effect on the
elationship between degree of diversiﬁcation and performance
elative to groups with no controlling shareholder (group “with no
ffective control”).
. Sample, variables and methodology
.1. Sample
The study sample comprises business groups in which the par-
nt company was listed on the Spanish stock market in each year of
he 2000–2005 period. We  have excluded groups in which the par-
nt company belongs to the ﬁnancial and/or energy sectors, as they
ave speciﬁc legal and accounting standards. The sample ﬁnally
onsists of 99 corporations (99 listed companies that head business
roups). Two  databases were fundamentally used: the National
tock Market Commission website (www.cnmv.es) and the SABI-
nforma database. With regard to the former, we  used the account
eports available to obtain the economic-ﬁnancial information used
n the study, and to identify all the ﬁrms included in the business
roups. The CNMV website provides information about signiﬁcant
hareholdings, identifying the nature of the ultimate owner of the
orporation.
Secondly, we also used the SABI-Informa database, which iden-
iﬁes the ultimate owner and its nature, enabling us to estimate the
orporation’s degree of diversiﬁcation, with access not only to the
conomic-ﬁnancial information of the parent company, but also to
ccounting information pertaining to its subsidiaries.
Fifty (50) of the 99 listed parent company are under family con-
rol; this is the largest group, showing the importance of families
n the Spanish stock exchange (Sacristán et al., 2011; Santana &
guiar, 2006). There are also 13 groups “without effective con-
rol”; these groups do not have a single owner (or group of similar
wners) with effective control of the organisation. There are also 10
roups controlled by banks and 6 by foreign agents. The ultimate
wner varied in 20 groups during the analysed period. Although
hey are included in the subsequent analyses, they are not sub-
ect to a detailed study, as creation of value will be affected by the
ature of the ultimate owners each year, and it would be difﬁcult
o determine their net effect on Tobin’s q-value.
.2. Variables
When analysing the relationship between diversiﬁcation, family
wnership and performance, it is very common in the litera-
ure to use Tobin’s q-value as a dependent variable (Miller, Le
reton-Miller, Lester, & Canella, 2007; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000;
illalonga & Amit, 2006). Tobin’s q is a measure of proﬁtability in
arket terms. It reﬂects the parent company’s expectations for
uture proﬁts, and hence the holding’s evaluation by investors.
obin’s q-value is calculated as the ratio between the parent com-
any’s market value and total assets (book value). The market value
s the sum of the market value of its equity and the book value of
ts debt (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Martínez, Stohr, & Quiroga,
007). The market value of its equity was estimated by multiply-
ng share value at the end of each year (31 December) by the total
umber of listed shares.
As independent variables, when deﬁning corporation, it is estab-
ished as the listed parent company plus all subsidiaries, according
o the criterion established by the Spanish General Accounting Plann Management and Business Economics 23 (2017) 46–54 49
of 2007, ﬁrms where the parent company has the majority of the
voting rights and/or the ability to appoint or dismiss most of the
members of the board of directors. Companies that form part of a
business group are identiﬁed in the annual report published by the
listed parent company.
A ﬁrm is considered to have an ultimate owner when its leading
shareholder directly or indirectly has 10 per cent or more of the
voting rights (La Porta et al., 1999). The ultimate owner is identi-
ﬁed by control chains. When a ﬁrm’s shares are held by another
company, the voting rights of the latter are analysed, identifying
its main shareholder, and so on as far as the ultimate owner of the
voting rights.
A group is considered to be a family enterprise when family
members represent the majority owners (directly and indirectly)
of the parent company and one or several family members
are in key positions as managers or members of the board of
directors; the group is a family concern throughout the study
period (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). Family members share a
surname or are connected by marriage. This deﬁnition of family
ﬁrm is based on the proposals of the European Commission
(http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/promoting-entrepreneurship/
we-work-for/family-business/index en.htm) and Instituto de
Empresa Familiar (http://www.iefamiliar.com/web/es/ief.html).
Groups are therefore classiﬁed as:
a) Family groups (FAM): groups in which the ultimate owners are
Spanish family members throughout the study period.
) Foreign group (FOR): groups in which the ultimate owners are
ﬁrms or individuals not residing in Spain.
c) Financial groups (FINAN): groups in which the ultimate owners
are banks or investment funds throughout the study period.
) Groups without effective control (NEC): groups in which there
is not a single owner (or group of similar owners) with effective
control of the organisation throughout the study period.
e) Groups with changes in ultimate owners (CUO): groups in which
the nature of the ultimate owner changed during the study
period.
Degree of diversiﬁcation (TOTAL DIV) is established considering
all the activities performed in the business group, both by the par-
ent company and by the pyramid of subsidiaries. Primary activity
and turnover are identiﬁed for all the ﬁrms in the group (parent
and subsidiaries). Considering group activities measures diversiﬁ-
cation more objectively, as a study of only the parent company’s
activities would ignore those of the subsidiaries, which also form
part of the corporation’s global strategy (Chen & Yu, 2011). Degree
of diversiﬁcation is measured by the entropy index (Jacquemin &
Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985).
According to prior research concerning creation of value, diver-
siﬁcation and family ownership (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chen &
Yu, 2011; Ducassy & Prevot, 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010; Kang,
1999; Maury & Pajuste, 2005), the following control variables are
considered: (i) Capital in the hands of the parent company’s ﬁve
main shareholders (% 5 SHARE), which is established as a measure of
concentration of ownership; (ii) size of listed parent company (LN
ASSETS), measured as the parent company’s total assets expressed
as logarithms; (iii) age (LN AGE), measured as the logarithm of the
difference between two  thousand and the year of establishment
of the listed parent company; (iv) indebtedness (DEBT), measured
as the ratio between the listed parent company’s total liabili-
ties and total assets; (v) capital intensity (CAP INT), measured as
the ratio between the sum of tangible and non-tangible assets
and the number of employees of the listed parent company; (vi)
non-tangible investment (NO TANG), the listed parent company’s
investment in the new technologies, measured by the ratio between
intangible assets and total assets; (vii) structural change in parent
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ompany (SCH), a dummy  variable with a value of 1 when there
as been a structural change in the listed parent company and 0
therwise.
.3. Methodology
In the results (see Section 4), we ﬁrst present a descriptive anal-
sis of the model’s different variables, considering the family and
on-family ownership of the different business groups, estimat-
ng the possible mean differences according to the nature of the
ltimate owner. We  ﬁrst estimate the Student’s t-values to test
he mean differences between family and non-family groups, then
pply the Brown-Forsythe and Kruskal–Wallis tests, which test the
ean differences between family groups and each of the different
ypes of non-family group (foreign, ﬁnancial and “with no effective
ontrol”).
Heckman’s two-step correction (1979) is used to test the ﬁve
ypotheses. This method is regularly used in the literature when
nalysing the relationship between performance, diversiﬁcation
nd family control (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Kang, 1999; Maury,
006; Miller et al., 2007). The Heckman two-step method cor-
ects the selection bias derived from diversiﬁcation (Kang, 1999),
nd considers the effect of the possible endogeneity derived
rom the business group’s family ownership (Demsetz & Lehn,
985).
A  Probit model is used in the ﬁrst stem, in which the endoge-
ous variable is a dummy  variable of diversiﬁcation (value is 1 if the
roup diversiﬁes and 0 otherwise), and the exogenous variables are
sed in the model (nature of ultimate owner, diversiﬁcation, con-
entration of ownership and control variables). A new variable is
dded in this ﬁrst step, the annual growth rate of sales, in order to
revent possible multicollinearity problems when applying Heck-
an. Finally, the inverse Mills ratio that corresponds to the decision
o diversify (div) is calculated.
Another Probit model is also estimated in order to analyse the
ndogenous nature of family ownership, in which the depend-
nt variable is the group’s family ownership, and the explanatory
ariables are sectoral dummies, ﬁrm size and cost of debt. This esti-
ates the inverse Mills ratio that corresponds to family ownership
fam).
In the second step of the Heckman model, we estimate an ordi-
ary least squares regression analysing the impact of the exogenous
ariables (nature of ultimate owner, diversiﬁcation, concentration
f ownership and control variables) on Tobin’s q-value, including
he previously analysed inverse Mills ratios (div and fam), cor-
ecting the possible selection bias due to diversiﬁcation and the
ndogeneity of family ownership.
. Results
.1. Descriptive analysis
Table 1 shows the mean values of the model’s variables and
he existence of differences according to the nature of the ultimate
wner. When comparing the family with the non-family groups, the
esults show that the former present a lower mean Tobin’s q-value
Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000): 1.640 for
amily groups and 2.044 for non-family groups. There is also a
ower mean degree of diversiﬁcation in family groups (0.506 versus
.731 for non-family enterprises), similar to the results obtained by
nderson and Reeb (2003) and Miller, Le Bretton Miller, and Lester
2010).In greater detail, considering the nature of the ultimate owner
f non-family groups, family enterprises present a lower Tobin’s q-
alue (except foreign groups). As shown in Table 1, ﬁnancial groups
resent the highest mean Tobin’s q-value (2.425), followed byn Management and Business Economics 23 (2017) 46–54
groups “with no effective control” (mean Tobin’s q-value = 2.123),
family groups (mean Tobin’s q-value = 1.640) and foreign groups
(1.483). Similarly, family groups are characterised by a lower degree
of diversiﬁcation, with the greatest differences between family
groups and groups “with no effective control” (the mean degree
of diversiﬁcation in family groups is 0.506 versus 0.765 in groups
“with no effective control”).
4.2. Econometric analysis
Table 2 analyses the impact of diversiﬁcation and family owner-
ship on Tobin’s q-value. The results correspond to the second step of
Heckman’s two-step correction, including the inverse Mills ratios
relative to diversiﬁcation (div) and to family ownership (fam).
Model 1 in Table 2 shows how the business group’s degree
of diversiﬁcation (  ˇ = 0.044,  > 0.10) does not affect Tobin’s q-
value, meaning that an increase in the number of new activities
performed by the group has no impact on performance (reject-
ing H1). These results are similar to those obtained by Delios and
Beamish (1999), Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002), and Mun˜oz
and Sánchez (2011). There is therefore no diversiﬁcation discount
(Berger & Ofek, 1995; Villalonga, 2004), as a greater degree of
diversiﬁcation does not affect performance, measured by Tobin’s
q-value. One possible explanation lies in the fact that the increase
in costs derived from greater diversiﬁcation is compensated by the
synergies derived from new activities (Palepu, 1985), so that the
negative effect of the former is compensated by the positive effect
of the latter. Also, as mentioned by Campa and Kedia (2002), diver-
siﬁcation can occur due to the poor performance of the original
business, in which case degree of diversiﬁcation is the result of a
process aimed at maximising shareholder returns. Indeed, ﬁrms
obtain a poor performance before the diversiﬁcation process, so it
does not necessarily determine the diversiﬁcation discount (Campa
& Kedia, 2002).
Model 2 shows how family control has a negative impact on
Tobin’s q-value (  ˇ = −0.222,  < 0.01). In other words, market eval-
uation of family groups is lower than that of non-family enterprises,
conﬁrming hypothesis H2 (Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003; Morck,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). The goal to maintain socio-emotional
wealth (keeping control of the business, preserve family connec-
tions, transfer the business to subsequent generations, etc.) makes
families give greater importance to it than to ﬁnancial performance
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010), providing that it does not endanger the
family business’ survival (Cennamo et al., 2012).
In greater detail, model 3 shows that the differences between
family and other groups largely lie in the greater creation of
value (measured by Tobin’s q-value) in groups controlled by ﬁnan-
cial enterprises (  ˇ = 0.539,  < 0.01) and foreign agents (  ˇ = 1.599,
 < 0.05) than in others, including family groups (  ˇ = 0.156,  > 0.10)
(rejection of H3). There is a difference in the impact of the type
of ultimate owner on performance, which is positive in ﬁnan-
cial groups and foreign enterprises, and zero in family groups
and groups “with no effective control”. The results show that the
preservation of socio-emotional wealth in family groups decreases
ﬁnancial performance, which is not the priority (Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2007; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010). However, even considering this
circumstance, family groups were expected to show a better perfor-
mance than groups “with no effective control”, where it is reduced
by managerial discretionary power. Therefore, the results obtained
show that the effect of the preservation of socio-emotional wealth
on performance is similar to the effect of the lack of a shareholder
of reference, and no differences are found between the two groups.
However, compared with ﬁnancial and foreign groups, the latter do
obtain a better performance, as they have shareholders of reference
and socio-emotional wealth is not part of their utility functions,
which focus on maximising proﬁts.
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Table  1
Mean differences in study variables, according to the nature of the corporation’s ultimate owner.
T-Student Non-family groups Brown–
Forsythe
Kruskal–
Wallis
Family
(n = 300)
Non-family
(n = 294)
Foreign
(n = 36)
Financial
(n = 60)
No effective
control (n = 78)
Changes
ultimate owner
(n = 120)
Tobin’s q-Value 1.640 2.044 *** 1.483 2.425 2.123 1.917 *** ***
Total diversiﬁcation 0.506 0.731 *** 0.583 0.593 0.765 0.819 *** ***
% 5 Share 0.659 0.483 *** 0.683 0.519 0.493 0.399 ** **
Ln ASSETS 11.46 12.45 *** 12.61 12.44 12.32 12.5 ** **
Ln AGE 3.59 3,66 3.66 3.75 4.02 3.38 *
Indebtedness 0.37 0.39 0.31 0.40 0.36 0.43 *
Non-tangible 0.025 0.034 0.010 0.022 0.054 0.034 *** ***
Capital intensity 4.56 4.84 * 5.06 4.77 4.57 5
Structural change 18% 27% ** 18.70% 30% 23.10% 30% *** **
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.001.
Table 2
Individual and joint impact of degree of diversiﬁcation and nature of last owner on Tobin’s q-value (second step of the Heckman correction).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FAM −0.222*** 0.156 0.155 −0.218 0.153
(−2.77) (1.15) (1.14) (−1.38) (0.80)
FOR 1.599** 1.663*** 1.662***
(5.90) (6.09) (6.06)
FINAN 0.539*** 0.571*** 0.571***
(3.17) (3.35) (3.34)
NEC 0.134 0.121 0.121
(0.93) (0.84) (0.84)
TOTAL  DIV 0.044 0.116 −0.024 0.115
(0.65) (1.59) (−0.22) (0.92)
FAM  * TOTAL
DIV
0.079 0.002
(0.52) (0.01)
div −0.789*** −0.682** −0.539** −0.682**
(−3.69) (−2.43) (−2.18) (2.42)
fam −0.033 −0.585*** −0.587*** −0.107 −0.588***
(−0.25) (−3.54) (−3.57) (−0.67) (−3.36)
%  5 Share −0.361** −0.054 −0.610*** −0.610*** −0.165 −0.611***
(−2.31) (−0.30) (−2.97) (2.98) (−0.75) (−2.89)
LN  ASSETS −0.032 0.045 −0.049 −0.045 −0.039 −0.045
(−0.59) (0.90) (−0.64) (−0.59) (−0.57) (−0.58)
LN  AGE 0.053 −0.044 −0.017 −0.034 −0.007 −0.034
(1.10) (−0.92) (−0.32) (−0.61) (−0.13) (−0.60)
Debt 0.162  0.002 0.594** 0.547** 0.324 0.547**
(0.78) (0.01) (2.24) (2.06) (1.27) (2.05)
NO  TANG 2.364*** 0.196 1.337 1.780* 0.670 1.777*
(4.05) (0.28) (1.42) (1.82) (0.97) (1.77)
CAP  INT −0.078*** −0.110*** −0.021 −0.015 −0.081*** −0.015
(−3.38) (−5.42) (−0.78) (−0.55) (−2.64) (−0.55)
SCH 0.204** 0.370*** 0.365*** 0.327*** 0.284*** 0.327***
(1.99) (3.59) (3.28) (2.89) (2.66) (2.75)
Constant 1.092 0.578 1.548* 1.449* 1.445** 0.145*
(1.62) (1.06) (1.91) (1.79) (1.99) (1.78)
F-value 8.73*** 6.03*** 6.33*** 6.16*** 4.61*** 5.83***
R2 0.2535 0.1935 0.2773 0.2834 0.1853 0.2834
R2-adjusted 0.2245 0.1615 0.2335 0.2375 0.1388 0.2349
N  375 367 316 316 316 316
*
r
T
p
e
t

o
ap < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.001.
Model 4 includes diversiﬁcation and family control in the same
egression, with reference to groups “with no effective control”.
he inclusion of diversiﬁcation relative to model 3 does not affect
erformance, and ﬁnancial groups (  ˇ = 0.571,  < 0.01) and foreign
nterprises (  ˇ = 1.663,  < 0.01) obtain a better market evaluation
han groups with no effective control, and family groups (  ˇ = 0.155,
 > 0.10) (rejection of hypothesis H3). This conﬁrms the results
btained in model 3, enabling it to distinguish between family
nd “no effective control” groups on the one hand, and foreignand ﬁnancial groups on the other, where the nature of the latter
increases Tobin’s q-value.
Finally, models 5 and 6 consider the interaction of family control
and degree of diversiﬁcation, establishing a comparison between
family and non-family groups (model 5) and between family groups
and groups “with no effective control” (model 6). This tests the
possible moderating effect of family control on the relationship
between degree of diversiﬁcation and performance (Kang, 1999;
Mun˜oz & Sánchez, 2011). Both models show that family control
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oes not affect the impact of diversiﬁcation on Tobin’s q-value (in
odel 5,  ˇ = −0.218,  > 0.10, and in model 6,  ˇ = 0.153,  > 0.10). In
ther words, family control does not have a moderating effect on
he relationship between diversiﬁcation and performance, similar
o non-family enterprises in general (Mun˜oz & Sánchez, 2011) or
f we compare with groups “with no effective control” in partic-
lar. This conﬁrms hypothesis H4b, rejecting hypotheses H4a and
5.
The above results show that the family nature of a business
roup does not affect the impact of diversiﬁcation on performance.
lthough the goal to maintain socio-emotional wealth favours
nvestments that increase performance (Mun˜oz & Sánchez, 2011), a
rincipal-principal agency problem (between the family and non-
amily shareholders) (Zahra, 2007) can lead to investments in new
usinesses that do not maximise proﬁts, which would explain the
esults obtained. Another possibility to be considered is that a fam-
ly business diversiﬁes but lacks the know-how or skills required
n the new businesses (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2002), which
ould hinder the use of synergies and reduce the positive impact
f diversiﬁcation on performance.
. Conclusions, limitations and future lines of research
This paper represents a contribution to the ﬁelds of family busi-
ess, diversiﬁcation strategies and performance, providing new
vidence about the individual and joint impact of family control and
egree of diversiﬁcation on market evaluation, considering busi-
ess groups as the analytical unit, and classifying non-family groups
ccording to the nature of their ultimate owner. After analysing a
ample of business groups in which the parent company is listed,
he results conﬁrm that there is a relationship between family con-
rol and performance, and that family control has little impact on
he effect of diversiﬁcation on performance, measured by Tobin’s
-value.
In a ﬁrst approximation, we ﬁnd that family groups are charac-
erised by a worse market evaluation than non-family enterprises
Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), and that
he differences are greater relative to groups controlled by ﬁnancial
oncerns and groups “with no effective control”. Family businesses
lso show a smaller degree of diversiﬁcation than non-family
rms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Miller, Le-Bretton Miller and Lester,
010), and the differences are greater relative to groups with no
hareholder of reference. The family’s involvement in manage-
ent aligns its interests with those of other shareholders, leading
o a smaller degree of diversiﬁcation in family groups relative to
hose where managers have greater discretionality (Goranova et al.,
007). The aim to preserve socio-emotional wealth also generated
ess interest in new activities, as this could lead to loss of control of
he company (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010).
When analysing the effect of degree of diversiﬁcation on a busi-
ess group’s performance, the results show that there is zero impact
Chen & Yu, 2011; Graham et al., 2002; Mun˜oz & Sánchez, 2011); in
ther words, there is no diversiﬁcation discount (Villalonga, 2004).
his could be because Spanish groups are characterised by high lev-
ls of concentration of ownership (Santana & Aguiar, 2006), which
nable the alignment of shareholder and manager interests, thus
reventing new activities that could harm the group’s performance
Berger & Ofek, 1995). The selection bias of diversiﬁcation was cor-
ected in the models, studying the possible endogeneity between
iversiﬁcation and performance (Graham et al., 2002), which can
ffect the results obtained (Sacristán et al., 2011).
When comparing the impact of type of group on the creation
f value, we ﬁnd that family control has a negative impact on per-
ormance (Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003; Morck et al., 2005; Thomsen
 Pedersen, 2000). The desire to maintain socio-emotional wealth
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010) means thatn Management and Business Economics 23 (2017) 46–54
families are more willing to renounce part of their business pro-
ﬁts in order to ensure control of the company and maintain all
emotional connections. These results show how markets anticipate
that problems derived from family control exceed its advantages.
Although family groups seek the survival of the business (Casson,
1999) and have a longer-term perspective, a high concentration
of shares owned by family members can give rise to problems
between majority and minority shareholders (Zahra, 2007), causing
internal conﬂicts and opportunistic behaviour by the family relative
to other investors (Astrachan, 2010).
Finally, when considering the joint effect of family control and
diversiﬁcation on performance, we ﬁnd that family control does
not have a positive moderating effect on the relationship between
diversiﬁcation and performance (Mun˜oz & Sánchez, 2011). When
considering nature of the ultimate owner, family groups and groups
“with no effective control” are similar, and Tobin’s q-value is not
affected. The performance of new activities by family enterprises
is seen by investors in the same way as for non-family groups,
as the market does not positively evaluate that a family’s diver-
siﬁcation could increase the company’s value. On  the other hand,
Tobin’s q-value is positively affected when the business group is
controlled by foreign agents or ﬁnancial institutions. These results
could show that investors prefer groups where ﬁnancial objectives
and the creation of value are more evident (ﬁnancial groups and
groups controlled by foreign agents who invest in Spain based on
ROI criteria) rather than in groups “with no effective control” or
family enterprises where creation of value can be compromised
(either due to managerial discretionality in the former or to prob-
lems derived from family control in the latter).
Finally, several contributions are made relative to previous
research. For Spain, the study provides new evidence regarding
the impact of family control and diversiﬁcation on performance. It
speciﬁcally considers major Spanish corporations with listed par-
ent companies, so that the measure of diversiﬁcation refers to the
entire group (parent company and subsidiaries). The use of Tobin’s
q-value as a measure of performance also shows investors’ expec-
tations not only in relation to the listed parent company, but also in
relation to the entire business group. Comparisons are also made
between family groups and different types of non-family corpo-
rations according to the nature of the ultimate owner, and the
moderating effect of family control on the relationship between
diversiﬁcation and performance, an aspect hardly considered in
family business literature, is also studied.
The research has several limitations. Firstly, the results obtained
correspond to a period before the economic crisis (2000–2005).
It would be a good idea to update the database in order to repli-
cate the study for the years of economic recession. We could then
see whether the economic crisis affected degree of diversiﬁcation
(resulting from readjustments and the sale of unproﬁtable busi-
nesses), the nature of the ultimate owner (possible changes in the
number of groups controlled by families, ﬁnancial or foreign insti-
tutions or “with no effective control”) and performance (reduced
as a result of the economic crisis). It could also be studied whether
there have been changes in the joint effect of diversiﬁcation and
family control on performance.
A second limitation of the study is that the results are valid for
business groups with listed parent companies, and cannot be gen-
eralised to unlisted enterprises. The following questions also arise.
Why are their family groups with listed parent companies and oth-
ers with unlisted parent ﬁrms? Do they not meet the requirements
of the Spanish stock markets, or do they prefer not to be listed?
What could the reasons be, to preserve socio-emotional wealth or
others? The answers to these questions, together with a study of
unlisted corporations, could lead to new lines of research.
A third limitation is that only the nature of the group’s main
shareholder is considered. Other shareholders often play a relevant
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ole regarding strategy, an aspect not analysed here. It would there-
ore be interesting to analyse the ownership structure of family
roups in greater detail, controlling the presence of other impor-
ant shareholders that could affect strategic decision-making (Jara
t al., 2008; Sacristán et al., 2011), with an impact on both degree
f diversiﬁcation and performance. The characteristics of the board
f directors and ﬁrm management, the presence of independent
xternal executives and the greater or smaller presence of fam-
ly board members (Minichilli, Corbetta, & Macmillan, 2010) are
actors that can affect diversiﬁcation strategies, and should be con-
rolled in future research.
Finally, the results of the study show how control by ﬁnancial
nstitutions and foreign agents improves performance, while it is
ot affected by family ﬁrms and groups “with no effective con-
rol”. There is therefore a need to study the differences between
amily, foreign and ﬁnancial groups. However, from the perspec-
ive of agency theory and socio-emotional wealth, if there is a
lear difference between family ﬁrms and groups “with no effec-
ive control”, why are there differences between family, ﬁnancial
nd foreign groups? In all three cases there is an ultimate owner
ho can exercise effective control. However, the objectives estab-
ished by ﬁnancial and foreign groups are different, as family groups
ive priority to the preservation of socio-emotional wealth. There
s therefore a need to discover the reasons for said differences, and
ow they can affect both diversiﬁcation and performance.
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